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Abstract—The concept of learned index structures relies on
the idea that the input-output functionality of a database index
can be viewed as a prediction task and, thus, be implemented
using a machine learning model instead of traditional algorithmic
techniques. This novel angle for a decades-old problem has
inspired numerous exciting results in the intersection of machine
learning and data structures. However, the main advantage of
learned index structures, i.e., the ability to adjust to the data at
hand via the underlying ML-model, can become a disadvantage
from a security perspective as it could be exploited.
In this work, we present the first study of poisoning attacks
on learned index structures. The required poisoning approach is
different from all previous works since the model under attack
is trained on a cumulative distribution function (CDF) and, thus,
every injection on the training set has a cascading impact on
multiple data values. We formulate the first poisoning attacks on
linear regression models trained on the CDF, which is a basic
building block of the proposed learned index structures. We gen-
eralize our poisoning techniques to attack a more advanced two-
stage design of learned index structures called recursive model
index (RMI), which has been shown to outperform traditional
B-Trees. We evaluate our attacks on real-world and synthetic
datasets under a wide variety of parameterizations of the model
and show that the error of the RMI increases up to 300× and
the error of its second-stage models increases up to 3000×.
I. INTRODUCTION
Database systems rely on index structures to access stored
data efficiently. It is known to the database community that
the motto “one size fits all” does not apply to traditional
indexing schemes [14] since each index provides different
performance guarantees that depend on the access pattern, the
nature of the workload, and the underlying hardware. Even
after choosing an appropriate index structure for a specific
application, it is usually the case that a database administrator
has to manually fine-tune the parameters of the system, either
through experience or with help from tuning tools. Another
challenge is that administrators of already deployed DBMS
might need to add new features and functionality to an existing
indexing scheme to adapt it to new scenarios in which case
the index structure and other components may have to be re-
tuned or replaced. The work by Kraska, Beutel, Chi, Dean,
and Polyzotis [18] challenged the above state of affairs by
reframing the building of an index structure as a machine
learning problem where the index learns to direct a query to
the appropriate memory location(s) based on a trained model
tailored on the data at hand.
Learned Index Structures. The concept of a learned
index structure (LIS) was proposed in 2018 [18] and has
already ignited a surge of exciting results [40], [37], [11],
[38], [9], [41], [22], [29], [10], [35], [7], [33], [14], [27],
[31], [12], [13], [23], [17] that blend ideas from machine
learning, data structures, and systems. The core idea of LIS
is to model the functionality of a data structure as a prediction
task, e.g., get a key as an input and predict its position in a
sorted collection of key-record pairs. This approach allows the
use of continuous functions to encode the data and learning
algorithms to accurately approximate the function.
Specifically, the approach proposed by Kraska et al. [18]
is to build the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the
keys. Given a key k as an input, the CDF returns the probability
that a key chosen according to this distribution takes value
less than or equal to k. Since the above probability is built
from the set of keys at hand, it is expressed as the ratio of
the number of keys less than k to the total number of keys.
Given this insight, one can use the CDF to (i) compute the
number of keys less than the (queried) key k and (ii) infer the
key’s memory location assuming the keys were sorted during
the initialization. Therefore, a simple linear regression on the
CDF gives an approximate location of the queried key.
Employing linear regression for a LIS is attractive from a
performance viewpoint since it costs a handful of parameters
for storage and a few multiplications and additions for pre-
diction. Indeed a linear regression on the CDF is one of the
building blocks that has been shown to work well [18] and can
be combined with hierarchical models, also called recursive
model index (RMI) structures, so as to balance the final
model for latency, memory usage, and computational cost. The
hierarchy can be seen as building a mixture of “experts” [25]
responsible for subsets of the data. For example, the upper
levels of the hierarchy can be a model that approximates well
the general shape of the function, e.g., a neural network model,
and the next level consists of fast and low-memory models that
capture well the local structure, e.g., linear regression model.
Interestingly, the above re-framing introduces a vastly dif-
ferent set of tools that differ from the traditional “discrete” way
of building and analyzing data structures. The abstract data
type (ADT) of a data structure can be implemented by a model
that deploys techniques such as unsupervised learning [41],
neural networks that act as an oracle [27], piece-wise linear
function approximation [38], [9], meta-learning [31] etc. Given
that systems can be seen as a collection of data structures and
algorithms, the community envisions using learning models as
basic building blocks to rethink systems that can automatically
adapt to different application data and workloads.
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A Security Perspective. As promising as it may sound
to combine ideas from machine learning and data structures,
no analysis has been performed to understand the security
challenges of the LIS approach. Intuitively, the advantage of a
LIS is that the model adapts to the data at hand. However, from
a security perspective, this efficiency might be problematic if
the adversary is capable of injecting maliciously crafted data
before the training of the model, i.e., at the initialization stage
of the index structure, so as to cause inaccurate predictions of
the location of legitimate data.
The technique of poisoning has been known to be an
effective attack vector for over a decade, e.g., see the references
in [16]. In the context of static index structures, we differentiate
between two scenarios to assess whether poisoning is a threat.
In the first scenario, a single user generates all the data stored
in the index. In the second scenario, the data stored in the
index comes from multiple sources as different entities directly
or indirectly contribute data, e.g., by generating data with their
actions or behavior. There is no opportunity for poisoning
in the first scenario since all data comes from a controlled
environment. Instead, in the second scenario, a malicious
actor can tailor its contributed data to deteriorate the index
performance.
We observe that both real-world datasets used for perfor-
mance experiments in the original LIS work [18] fall under
the second scenario and thus are susceptible to poisoning
attacks. The first such dataset comprises timestamps generated
by users’ web-server requests (Weblog data) and the second
dataset consists of editable geolocation data maintained by an
open network of users (OpenStreetMap data). Other examples
of indexed data generated by multiple sources include data
from personalized medicine where patients voluntarily con-
tribute their own data as well as cyber-security analytics where
any user can submit its own indicators of compromise.
The threat model we study, much like other fundamental
poisoning results [3], [4], [16], [42], [43], considers the case
where the (training) data is known and the adversary has the
ability to contribute maliciously crafted data. We analyze this
blind spot in the LIS body of work by addressing the following
question:
Is it possible to manipulate the performance of
learned index structures by poisoning its learning
components?
In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative
by presenting new poisoning attacks for regression models on
CDF that is used for learned index structures. We extend our
approach to the hierarchical architecture of RMI. As we show,
attacks on CDFs present different structure and challenges
than known poisoning attacks [16]. We rigorously analyze
these challenges and tailor our attacks to the family of CDF
functions. Our work is the first to demonstrate the implications
of not taking into consideration the security mindset when
developing models for learned index structures.
Defending against the proposed poisoning attacks is chal-
lenging. One might argue that a way to deal with these attacks
is to substitute the linear regression on CDF approach with
a more complex and robust model that better captures the
adjustments of the CDF when a maliciously crafted point
is added. However, the outperformance by LIS of traditional
index data structures crucially depends on linear regression
since it it relies on (i) computational efficiency from executing
one multiplication and one addition; and (ii) space efficiency
from storing two parameters, therefore allowing to store tens
of thousands of linear regression models in main memory.
Migrating a LIS to a more complex model to mitigate the
risk of poisoning would introduce significant overhead in time
and/or storage, thus substantially reducing or eliminating the
performance advantage of LIS over traditional index structures.
Our Contributions. Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We formulate the problem of single-point poisoning a linear
regression model on the cumulative distribution function
(CDF). We propose a poisoning attack on CDFs that finds
the optimal poisoning key that maximizes the poisoning
effect on the loss function and has complexity linear to the
number of legitimate keys.
• We propose a multiple-point poisoning attack on linear
regression on CDF. We follow a greedy approach based on
our optimal and efficient single-point poisoning attack. We
conduct extensive experiments under a variety of scenarios
to study the impact of different parameterizations. Our ex-
periments show that the effect of our multi-point poisoning
attack can increase the mean squared error (typical loss
function of regression) up to 100×.
• We propose a poisoning attack for the two-stage recursive
model index (RMI) architecture that was shown to out-
perform [18] the highly-optimized traditional B-Tree data
structure. Our attack targets the linear regression models
of the second stage of the RMI. We propose an iterative
technique that decides the number of poisoning keys for
each second-stage model so as to increase the error of the
overall RMI model. We evaluate the attack in uniformly
and highly skewed (log-normal) key distributions under
a variety of RMI parameterizations. We also apply the
attack on real data from (i) the salaries of employees in
Dade County in Miami [24], and (ii) publicly available
geolocation dataset [30]. Our experiments show that the
poisoning attack can increase the error of the RMI model up
to 300× and the error of an individual second-stage model
up to 3000×.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the first work on learned index structures [18] the
community has explored several interesting research directions.
In terms of dynamizing the LIS framework, the work by Hadian
and Heinis [10] proposes a method to minimize the error
caused by updating the index. The first family of updatable LIS
is called ALEX [7]. The work by Tang et al. [35] studies the
case where the distribution of the workload evolves as queries
are issued and proposes to re-train the model to account for
such a dynamic environment. Another recent interesting line of
work proposes learned multi-dimensional index structures [29]
as well as learned existence indexes for multi-dimensional
data [22]. PAVO [41] takes an unsupervised neural network
approach, for locating the position of the key value in the
index. The work by Wu et al. [40] uses ML-enhanced data
structures for exploiting correlation among columns and reduce
the memory consumption by secondary indexes.
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The combination of ML and data structures from [18]
has inspired new ML-based approaches for traditionally al-
gorithmic problems such as low-rank decomposition [15],
space partitioning for nearest neighbor search [8], frequency
estimation in data streams [12]. The work by Hadian et al. [11]
proposes an alternative approach where instead of replacing
the traditional data structure with a learned index, one can
assist known data structures with ML techniques. The work
by Setiawan et al. [33] observes that the underlying process
of LIS can be seen as a fitting problem, as opposed to a
learning problem, and for that the authors deploy polynomial
interpolation techniques to approximate the location of a key.
System designs are also inspired by the work in [18].
SAGEDB [17] is a database that adapts to an application
through code synthesis and ML. DECIMA [23] deploys rein-
forcement learning and ML to learn workload-specific schedul-
ing algorithms. The work by Idreos et al. [13] takes a step to-
wards self-designing key-value stores with the ability to adapt
to changes by alternating between different data structures. For
completeness we note that other works considered self-tuning
systems as well [36], [20], [2].
Known Poisoning Attacks. The line of work for poi-
soning attacks analyzes the capabilities of adversaries that
deliberately augment the training data to manipulate the results
of the predictive model. By submitting the poisoning data the
target model updates itself and deteriorates its performance.
The work by Biggio et al. [3] inserts maliciously crafted
training data to change the decision function of the SVM and,
thus, increase the test error. The case of poisoning attack on
clustering algorithms is studied in [4]. The work by Xiao et
al. [42] studies the robustness of feature selection algorithms
against poisoning attacks. Yang et al. [43] propose gradient-
based methods for generating poisoning points for Neural
Networks. Suciu et al. [34] propose a framework for evaluating
realistic adversaries that conduct poisoning attacks on machine
learning algorithms. Finally, the work that is closest to ours
is the results by Jagielski et al. [16]. The authors propose
an optimization framework for poisoning attacks on linear
regression as well as a defense mechanism called TRIM. We
emphasize that our attack differs significantly from [16] since
we address the case of poisoning CDF functions for which
every insertion affects the values of all points of the dataset.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we give background on LIS, poisoning
attacks, and the adversarial model of our work.
Terminology. We denote a key by k and its key universe as
K, where |K| = m. The set of all keys of an index is denoted
as K ⊆ K. The set of keys K has size n and contains no
multiplicities. The density of a keyset K is the ratio |K|/|K| =
n/m. For simplicity, we assume that keys are non-negative
integers therefore we can always derive the total order of the
keyset, much like [18]. Each key is associated with a record
and we assume that the records are stored at an in-memory
dense array that is sorted with respect to the key values.
A. Background on Learned Index Structures
The work by Kraska et al. [18] proposes alternative ML-
based implementation for index structures such as range
indexes, traditionally implemented by B-trees, point indexes,
traditionally implemented by HashMap, and existence indexes,
traditionally implemented by Bloom filters. Learned Index
Structures (LIS) are based on a simple yet powerful obser-
vation that locating a key k within a set of linearly ordered
keys can be reduced to approximating the probability that
a random key would take value less or equal than k, i.e.,
Pr(X ≤ k) = RANK(k)/n, where X is the random variable
that follows the empirical distribution of the n keys and
RANK() is a function that takes a key as an input and outputs
its relative position among the n keys. This probability is
captured by the cumulative distribution function (CDF), thus,
the task of locating a key boils down to learning the CDF of the
sorted key set. We consider the non-normalized CDF, therefore
in a CDF plot the X-axis represents the key values and the
Y -axis the rank of the key, see Figure 1. For generalizing to
complex distributions the authors propose the Recursive Model
Index (RMI), a multi-stage architecture where models on a
higher stage direct the query to models on a lower stage to
fine-tune the precision of the predicted memory location.
Fig. 1. An illustration of the Recursive Model Index (RMI) with a two-stage
architecture. The first stage is a single neural network model while the second
stage is series of linear regression models on 1-out-of-N key partitions of
equal size.
The evaluation in [18] shows that the following RMI archi-
tecture outperforms B-Trees in speed and memory utilization: a
two-stage RMI architecture with tree structure between models
and a partition of non-overlapping keyset of equal size assigned
to models on the leaves. For the root model, or first-stage
model, the authors deploy a neural network model that can
capture the coarse-grained shape of complex functions. The
authors propose the use of a large number of leaves, i.e.,
fanout in the order of thousands, each of which predicts the
final memory location of the queried key. Each leaf represents
a second-stage model that performs linear regression on the
CDF of a subset of keys, i.e., a fast and storage-efficient model.
If the prediction is not accurate then a local search around
the predicted location discovers the record. For simplicity,
we assume fixed-length records and logical paging over a
continuous memory region.
B. Background on Poisoning Attacks
Let D = {xi, yi}ni=1 denote the data used by a learning
model, where the feature vector is x ∈ Rd and the response
variable is y ∈ R. In the linear regression model, the output is
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computed via a linear function f(x,w, b) = wTx + b with
parameters w ∈ Rd and b ∈ R. The parameters w, b are
chosen so as to minimize the loss function L(D,w, b) =
1
n
∑n
i=1(f(xi, w, b) − yi)2 which is the mean squared error
(MSE). We note that regression differs from classification
since the output is a numerical value, as opposed to a class
label. Poisoning attack is described as a bilevel optimization
problem: given the target model as the first-level minimization
of the error function, the attacker aims to find new data that
maximize the outcome of the first-level minimization. Previ-
ous works focus on gradient-based poisoning attacks. Some
works propose alternatives to analytically solving the bilevel
optimization problem, e.g., sampling-based approach [16] and
generative method [43].
Our single-point poisoning attack in Section IV-C takes a
different approach by exploiting the structure of CDFs and
computes the location of the poisoning point that maximizes
the minimum error in a single pass over the legitimate keys.
The multiple-point poisoning attack and the attack on RMI are
extensions of our optimal and efficient poisoning approach.
C. Adversarial Model
Attacker Goals. Poisoning attacks can be categorized into
poisoning integrity attacks and poisoning availability attacks.
Integrity attacks form a loss function over specific datapoints of
interest and therefore aim for a targeted mis-prediction on this
data. Availability attacks aim to indiscriminately deteriorate the
performance of the model. In this work we focus on poisoning
availability attacks on a LIS with the goal of deteriorating its
performance and thus, defeating the very purpose of ML-based
indexes. Specifically, the attacker’s objective is to generate
a small number of additional training keys, called poisoning
keys, that together with the legitimate keys will train an LIS
model on the CDF that has prediction accuracy significantly
lower compared to an LIS trained only on legitimate keys.
Attacker Capabilities & Knowledge. The attacker inserts
p maliciously crafted poisoning keys before the training of
the model. We denote the set of p poisoning keys as P and
the overall poisoned keyset as K ∪ P , which contains n + p
keys. We call poisoning percentage the term 100 · (p/n).
Following the footsteps of previous works, the allowable
poisoning percentage is upper bounded by at most 20%. We
only consider white-box attacks where the attacker has access
to the training data, i.e., keyset K, and the exact parameters of
the model, e.g, parameters w and b for linear regression or the
parameters of all stages and models for RMI. We note that this
is a standard assumption in poisoning attacks. To adjust our
techniques to the case of black-box scenario, one has to first
infer the parameters of the models. Due to the fact that RMIs
are tuned so as to beat the performance of traditional data
structures, the architecture choices are limited and it would
be enough to infer the parameters of the second-stage models,
which are linear regressions.
Attack Evaluation Metric. The evaluation of the LIS
performance in the original work by Kraska et al. [18] is
performed by measuring the lookup time in nanoseconds.
The final benchmark numbers in their work are the result
of custom code, designed for small models, which removes
all unnecessary overhead and instrumentation that Tensorflow
introduces in larger models. Unfortunately, the result of their
engineering efforts and optimizations are not publicly available
and therefore, we can not directly measure the effect of
poisoning in LIS with respect to the time performance. In
our work we evaluate the performance of our attacks with an
implementation-independent metric. Specifically, we compute
the Ratio Loss, which is the ratio between the mean square
error (MSE) function of the poisoned dataset and the MSE of
the non-poisoned dataset.
IV. POISONING REGRESSION MODELS ON CDF
In the paradigm of learned index structures (LIS) [18] the
location of a key-record pair is computed by approximating
the relative order, i.e., the rank, of the queried key. An
accurate approximation of the rank allows the algorithm to
jump directly to the desired memory location of the linearly
ordered key-record pairs without touching the rest of the data
in the index. In this section we propose attacks for poisoning
the linear regression model on CDF, a building block for RMI.
The proposed attack inserts points in the database with the goal
of increasing the approximation error of the regression and as
a result degrade the time performance of the overall design.
A New Flavor of Poisoning. For an index with keyset K
of size n, each key k ∈ K has a rank r in the interval [1, n],
which is the position of k in the sorted sequence of K. LIS
approximates the rank of a queried key by a linear regression
model on the two dimensional data (k, r), where the X-value
is the key and the Y -value is the rank of the key. The function
approximated by the model is the non-normalized cumulative
distribution function.
In the traditional poisoning attacks on regression mod-
els [16], i.e., not on CDF functions, the insertion of a poisoning
point causes a “local” change since it does not affect the X-
and Y -values of any of the legitimate points. On the contrary,
for the case of LIS, the insertion of a single maliciously crafted
key kp changes the rank of all the legitimate keys larger
than kp. Consequently, this “global” change on the rank of
legitimate keys triggers an extensive change on the CDF itself.
This compound effect of an adversarial insertion has not been
analyzed before. In this work, we introduce a new flavor of
poisoning attacks on learned index structures.
Before addressing the general LIS design, which is com-
prised of a two-stage learning architecture, we first pose a
more fundamental question that focuses on the new flavor of
poisoning:
What is the optimal poisoning strategy that maxi-
mizes the error of linear regression applied on a
CDF?
We answer this question by developing an efficient poisoning
attack for maximizing the error of a linear regression on a CDF.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. Sec-
tion IV-A formalizes the problem statement. In Section IV-B,
we provide an intuitive explanation of our attack strategy. A
detailed description of our attack method and analysis of its
performance and complexity are given in Sections IV-C–IV-D.
Finally, Section IV-E contains an experimental evaluation of
the practical effectiveness of our attack.
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A. Problem Statement
We first define the linear regression framework on cumu-
lative density functions. The following definition bridges the
notions of ranks and their corresponding CDF.
Definition 1 (Linear Regression on CDFs). Let K =
{k1, · · · , kn} ⊆ K be the set of integers that correspond
to the keys of the index. Every key ki ∈ K has its
associated rank ri ∈ [1, n]. The linear regression model
on a CDF computes a pair of regression parameters (w, b)
that minimizes the following mean squared error (MSE)
function :
min
w,b
L ({ki, ri}ni=1, w, b) = min
w,b
(∑n
i=1
(wki + b− ri)2
)
.
In this work we focus on non-regularized linear regression,
much like the original work on LIS by Kraska et al. [18]. The
goal of regularization is to generalize the model on unseen
(testing) data; in LIS the majority of queries are expected to be
data stored in the index structure, i.e., training data. Therefore
the impact of regularization is unclear in the context of LIS.
We can derive a closed-form solution to the minimiza-
tion problem of Definition 1. Notice that the set K can be
interpreted as a sample from the set of keys K. Given this
probabilistic point of view, we define the sample mean of the
key set as MK and the sample mean of the rank set as MR. We
define the sample variance as VarK and VarR, and the sample
covariance between K and R as CovKR. Lastly, the sample
mean of the squares of the keys, resp. ranks, is defined as MK2 ,
resp. MR2 . Recall that the formulas of variance and covariance
are, CovXY = MXY −MXMY , VarX = MX2 −M2X .
Theorem 1. [28] The Linear Regression from Definition 1
admits the following closed-form solution:
w∗ = CovKRVarK , b
∗ = MR − w∗MK ,L(K,R,w∗, b∗) = −Cov
2
KR
VarR
+ VarK .
The adversarial goal of the newly introduced poisoning at-
tack for linear regression on CDF is described in the following.
Definition 2 (Poisoning Linear Regression on CDF).
Let K be the set of n integers that correspond to
the keys and let P be the set of p integers that
comprise the poisoning points. The augmented set
on which the linear regression model is trained is
{(k′1, r′1), (k′2, r′2), · · · , (k′n′ , r′n′)}, where k′i ∈ K∪P and
r′i ∈ [1, n+ p]. The goal of the adversary is to choose a
set P of size at most λ so as to maximize the loss function
of the augmented set K∪P which is equivalent to solving
the bilevel optimization problem:
arg maxP s.t. |P |≤λ
(
min
w,b
L ({k′i, r′i}n+pi=1 , w, b))
The upper bound λ in the size of P is chosen to be
proportional to the size of the keyset, e.g., λ = 0.2n. We define
the notions of number sequence and discrete derivative [26]
that we use later in this section. A number sequence A is
an ordered list of numbers and we denote with A(i) the i-th
number in the sequence.
Definition 3. [Discrete Derivative] [26] A discrete derivative
of a sequence A is defined as the difference between consec-
utive numbers in the sequence A. We denote the sequence of
discrete derivatives of A as ∆A. Formally:
∆A(i) = A(i+ 1)−A(i)
B. The Compound Effect of Poisoning CDF
For the sake of illustration we use a naive brute force
approach to poison a key set with n = 10 keys. Figure 2-
(A) shows the original database key set on the X-axis and the
corresponding ranks on the Y -axis, while Figure 2-(B) shows
the regression line after the poisoning. The blue vertical lines
indicate the distance of the point from the regression line, i.e.,
the error incurred by this key. Therefore one can illustrate the
MSE by summing the square of the above distances. The key
kp, colored in red, is the optimal poisoning location. Due to
the compound effect of an insertion on the CDF, the ranks, i.e.
the Y -value, of the points after kp increase by one.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the compound effect of poisoning using a single key kp
colored in red. All original keys that are larger than kp increase their rank by
one. The new regression line, dotted red line, accumulates larger error from
most of the original points due to the adjustment of ranks.
In a typical setting of poisoning regression models, the
addition of a single point has a limited overall impact since
all the other points stay in their original X-, Y -coordinates.
Thus, even if we maintain the original regression line, as
opposed to re-training to take the new key into consideration,
the MSE error would increase by the contribution introduced
by the poisoning point. On the contrary, for the case of CDFs
the addition of a single point can affect the rank, i.e., Y -
coordinates, of many original points of the CDF. In other
words, a single point might force the regression line to incur
a compound error from a large portion of the original points.
The example of Figure 2 demonstrates this phenomenon, notice
that the error-contribution by the majority of the keys, depicted
with vertical blue segments is significantly larger.
C. Optimal Single-Point Poisoning on CDF
This subsection is the main technical tool that we build
upon in the rest of this work. We propose an efficient and
optimal poisoning attack for a single poisoning point. To avoid
inserting out-of-range keys or introducing outliers (both poi-
soning approaches can be detected and eliminated by known
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mitigations) we deem as potential poisoning keys the ones that
lie in-between the smallest and the largest legitimate key.
A First Attempt. Since the key space is finite, we are
guaranteed to find the optimal poisoning key if we compute
the updated loss function for every potential poisoning key.
For each poisoning, it takes time complexity O(n) to compute
the loss from scratch, where n is the number of existing keys.
Since there are m− n possible locations the time complexity
of this approach is O(mn). For large databases with millions
of keys and even larger keyspace this brute force approach is
not practical.
Our Approach. The efficiency and optimality of our poisoning
attack is based on the following observations about the struc-
ture of the problem:
1) The loss function L can be seen as a sequence. For a
fixed keyset K, the loss function after poisoning boils down to
a function that only depends on the location of the poisoning
key kp. Therefore one can see the loss function L as a sequence
denoted as L where its index represents the location of the
poisoning key kp, and its output, denoted as L(kp), represents
the MSE if we were to choose kp as the poisoning key. Since
multiplicities are not allowed we get the following expression
for the sequence:
L(kp) =
minw,b
( ∑
k′∈K∪kp
(wk′ + b− r′)2
)
, if kp /∈ K
⊥ , if kp ∈ K
Likewise, the mean of keys MK(kp) is a sequence where each
value is the mean of the poisoned keyset with respect to the
chosen poisoning key. The mean of the new ranks MR(kp), the
variance of the poisoned keys VarK(kp), and the covariance
between the poisoned keys and the new ranks CovKR(kp) are
all sequences with the poisoning key as their index.
2) The value of L(kp) can be re-used to compute
L(kp + 1). In the “first attempt”, one computes the new loss
function on each potential poisoning key by processing the
entire dataset, i.e., time complexity O(n) for every evaluation.
Our insight is that we can pay the linear cost once, i.e., O(n)
for the first potential poisoning key, and then compute the new
loss function for the next poisoning key in constant time. To
achieve this computation between consecutive keys we use the
notion of discrete derivative of the sequence L(kp), denoted
as ∆L(kp). Using the expressions for the optimal parameters
of the regression from Theorem 1 we can directly compute
the new loss function with optimal parameters for the updated
regression model. See the full version of our work for the
application of the product and quotient rule that outputs the
updated loss function. The discrete gradients of the sequences
are computed in constant time. Therefore, we can compute the
value of the entire sequence for the loss function in O(m+n)
time, as opposed to O(mn) of the “first attempt”.
3) Loss function is the composition of convex subse-
quences. As identical keys are not allowed in the index, the do-
main of the entire loss sequence is comprised of subsequences
where the domain of each of them consists of consecutive
poisoning keys. The existing keys K divide the key space into
at most (n− 1) subsequences. The rank of that the poisoning
key takes is the same within each subsequence. In the next
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the loss function and its first derivative from the
keyset of Figure 2. Each subsequence of consecutive poisoning keys is convex
w.r.t. the loss function.
Algorithm 1: GREEDYPOISONINGREGRESSIONCDF
Data: The number of allowed poisoning keys p, the original
dataset for the regression {(k1, r1), . . . , (kn, rn)}
where ki ∈ K and ri ∈ [1, n].
Result: Set of poisoning keys P such that P ∩K = ∅ and
|P | = p.
1 Initialize the set of poisoning keys P ← ∅;
// Follow a greedy approach, choose
locally optimal poisoning
2 for every j from 1 to p do
3 Partition the non-occupied keys, i.e., keys not in K ∪ P ,
into subsequences such that each subsequence consists
of consecutive non-occupied keys;
// Due to convexity, the loss function
is maximized at an endpoint
4 Extract the endpoints of each subsequence and sort them
to construct the new sequence of endpoints S(i), where
i ≤ 2(n+ j);
5 Compute the rank that key S(i) would have if it was
inserted in K ∪ P and assign this rank as the i-th
element of the new sequence T (i), where i ≤ 2(n+ j);
// Evaluate each sequence for the
smallest endpoint
6 Compute the effect of choosing S(1) as a poisoning key
and inserting it to K ∪ P with the appropriate rank
adjustments. Specifically, evaluate the sequences each of
which is the mean M for a different variable, e.g., K, R,
KR. Compute MK(1),MK2(1),MKR(1), and L(1) ;
7 for every i from 2 to the length of sequence S do
8 Compute the effect of choosing S(i+ 1) as a
poisoning key by calculating the loss function
L(i+ 1) from the equations in (13);
9 end
10 Define as kOPT ← S(argmaxiL(i)) the chosen poisoning
key which maximizes the loss;
11 Augment P as P ← P ∪ kOPT ;
12 end
13 return the set of poisoning keys P ;
theorem we prove that each subsequence is convex with respect
to the evaluation of the loss function.
Theorem 2. Let K be the set of original keys. Let L(kp) be
the sequence where for input kp it outputs the value of the loss
function on a linear regression model trained on K ∪ kp. The
loss sequence L(kp) is convex on the domain defined between
each consecutive pair of key values ki and ki+1 in the set of
keys K.
A corollary of the above theorem is that due to convexity,
the maximum loss for each convex subsequence is given either
by the first or the last poisoning key of its domain, i.e., the
endpoints. Therefore, we can compute the global maximum of
the entire loss sequence by a constant-time computation for
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Fig. 4. Application of the poisoning attack on CDF using 10 poisoning
keys on a data set of 90 uniformly distributed keys. Our attack increases the
error by 7.4×. Each point contributes to the overall error by its distance to
the regression line, indicated with blue vertical lines. Poisoning keys, colored
red, are clustered on dense areas so as to exacerbate the non-linearity of the
poisoned CDF.
each subsequence which reduces the time complexity of the
computation from O(m + n) to O(n). Figure 3 presents the
loss function across the key space; the convexity can be seen
by the first derivative plot of this example.
Optimal Poisoning. We put the above observations to-
gether to define the closed-form formulas that compute the
evaluation of the loss function for the poisoned set of keys.
Let (k1, r1), . . . , (kn, rn) be the sequence of pairs of keys
and ranks for a dataset. The set of keys k1, . . . , kn imply a
collection of subsequences in the key domain such that each
subsequence is comprised of consecutive non-occupied keys.
For example, consider the key-rank
pairs (k1, r1), (k2, r2), (k3, r3), (k4, r4) ,
(2, 1), (6, 2), (7, 3), (12, 4). The subsequences of non-
occupied keys for the key domain K =[1,13] are: {1},
{3, 4, 5}, {8, 9, 10, 11}, {13}. Due to observation 3) we only
need to consider the endpoints of each subsequence, i.e., for
our example the endpoints are {1}, {3, 5}, {8, 11}, {13}.
We define sequence S where the element S(i) corresponds
to the i-th smallest key among all the endpoints from all
subsequences. For our running example we have S(1) =
1, S(2) = 3, S(3) = 5, S(4) = 8, S(5) = 11, S(6) = 13. We
also define the sequence T where the element T (i) corresponds
to the rank that the poisoning key S(i) would take if it
is inserted. For our example we have T (1) = 1, T (2) =
2, T (4) = 2, T (5) = 4, T (6) = 4, T (7) = 5. To simplify
the notation we index all the subsequences with respect to the
index of sequence S, i.e., the notation MK(i) is equivalent to
MK(k) where k ← S(i).
The attacker first calculates the effect of inserting the first
potential poisoning key S(1), which implies the calculation
of the values MK(1),MK2(1),MKR(1), and L(1). The effect
of inserting poisoning key S(i+ 1) on the loss function, i.e.,
L(i+ 1), can be computed in constant time as:
MK(i+ 1) = MK(i) +
∆S(i)
n+ 1
, MK2(i+ 1) = MK2(i) +
(2S(i) + ∆S(i)) ∆S(i)
n+ 1
MR(i) =
n+ 2
2
, MR2(i) =
(n+ 2)(2n+ 3)
6
, MKR(i+ 1) = MKR(i) +
T (i)∆S(i)
(n+ 1)
L(i+ 1) = − (MKR(i+ 1)−MK(i+ 1)MR(i+ 1))
2
MK2(i+ 1)− (MK(i+ 1))2
+MR2(i+ 1)− (MR(i+ 1))2
Our algorithm is an insightful speedup of the “first attempt”
that is based on the effect of poisoning on the CDF function.
The above approach maximizes the error of the poisoning for a
single poisoning key in O(n) time complexity. The algorithm
for the single-point poisoning runs as a subroutine in the
Algorithm 1, see Lines 3-10.
D. Greedy Multiple-Point Poisoning on CDF
We generalize the single-point approach so as to insert
multiple poisoning keys. Specifically, we propose a greedy
approach where at each iteration the attacker makes a locally
optimal decision and inserts the poisoning key that maximizes
the error of the augmented keyset so far, see Algorithm 1.
Even though we do not provide a proof of optimality for the
greedy multiple-point poisoning approach, we experimentally
observed that our approach matched the performance of the
brute-force attack in every tested dataset. Figure 4 presents
the application of the greedy approach on dataset of 90 keys.
Notice that the greedy approach places poisoning keys in a
dense area so as to exacerbate the non-linearity of the CDF
and consequently increase the error.
E. Evaluation
In this subsection we evaluate the effect of greedy multi-
point poisoning in a plethora of scenarios. We observe that
the error increases up to 100× depending on the size of the
domain of keys and the density of the keys in the domain.
Setup. We produce synthetic datasets of keys that are uni-
formly distributed. We note here, according to the observations
from Section IV-D, that the uniform distribution has small
MSE loss because of the linearity of the CDF implied by the
uniform distribution. In other words, these datasets are the ones
that the linear regression on CDF can capture well and, thus,
one of the cases where learned index structures outperform
traditional methods. We chose four different parameters for
our experiments. The first is the number of legitimate keys
(denoted as “Keys”), the second is the density of the legitimate
keys over the key domain (denoted as “Density”). The third
which can be computed from the first two, is the size of the
key domain (denoted as “Key Domain”), and the fourth is the
percentage of poisoning keys with respect to the number of
legitimate keys. Following the footsteps of previous poisoning
attacks [16] we only consider poisoning percentage up to 15%.
We note that in our experiments we fix the number of keys
and the density and adjust the key domain accordingly. The
reason behind this design choice has to do with the architecture
7
Fig. 5. Evaluation of the multi-point poisoning for linear regression on CDF. Each boxplot shows the ratio of the evaluation of the MSE loss on the poisoned
keyset over the evaluation of the MSE loss on the legitimate keyset over 20 distinct keysets. The legitimate keys are distributed uniformly. The number of
legitimate keys, denoted as “Keys” and the size of the key domain, denoted as “Key Domain” are presented on the title of each plot. The number of poisoning
keys varies on the X-axis and is represented as a poisoning percentage with respect to the number of legitimate keys.
of the original work on LIS [18]. Specifically, in their two-
level architecture of recursive model index the model partitions
the entire keyspace so that each partition has a fixed number
of keys and as a result the size of the key domain varies
between partitions, as opposed to a fixed key domain size with
varying number of keys. The chosen key domain sizes in our
experiments were picked so as to follow typical domain sizes
where the regression on LIS was performed in the original
work [18].
To measure the effectiveness of the proposed greedy multi-
point poisoning attack we record the Ratio Loss which is the
ratio of the MSE loss function on the union of poisoning and
legitimate keys, over the MSE loss on the set of legitimate
keys. Each setup was run 20 times and we report the boxplot
of the recorded ratio loss.
Results. The results of our evaluation are presented in
Figure 5. For a fixed number of legitimate keys and a fixed
key density, i.e., focusing on a single plot of Figure 5, we
see that the higher the poisoning percentage the larger the
ratio between the loss functions. For instance, in the large
key domains we see that the ratio increases up to 100× as
the poisoning percentage gets larger. On the other hand, we
also observe that the cases where both the density is high,
e.g., 80%, and the key domain is large may result in a much
smaller error increase. This is explained by the fact that there
is a large number, e.g., thousands, of legitimate keys that are
densely and uniformly distributed and, thus, already form an
almost-linear CDF which means that inserting a small number
of poisoning keys won’t affect the error significantly.
The same number of fixed legitimate keys may correspond
to a different key domain density, i.e., comparing a row of
boxplots from Figure 5. Another interesting observation from
our experiments is that lower density for the same fixed number
of legitimate keys implies a larger set of potential poisoning
keys and, thus, allows for a greater increase of error, can be
seen from the drop of the ratios on a fixed row of boxplots. The
above intuition is confirmed even when we compare a column
of boxplots, i.e., fix the key density and increase the domain.
In that case we observe that larger domains with the same fixed
density also imply a larger set of potential poisoning keys and
thus allows for a greater increase of error.
Additional Experiments. Jumping ahead, the superior per-
formance of RMI relies (in part) on the fact that it partitions the
keyset in small consecutive keysets that are roughly similarly
distributed. Therefore, even if the overall CDF has structure
that is hard to capture, each “local” structure is similar enough
that it can be captured well with a simple model. Based on
the above rationale we performed experiments on a uniformly
distributed keyset for the linear regression experiments, i.e.,
which corresponds to the local model. For completeness, we
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present additional experiments for poisoning linear regression
in Figure 8, see the Appendix of this work. The setup of
these experiments is the same as above with the difference
that the keyset is distributed according to a normal distribution.
Specifically, for a key domain U = [α, β] we form the normal
distribution with mean µ = β+α2 and standard deviation
σ = β−α3 . We note that normal distributions are not captured
well by linear models. Even in this case where the loss of the
original data is already large, our attack achieves up to 8×
increase of error, see Figure 8.
V. POISONING TWO-STAGE RMI MODELS
Armed with the poisoning technique for regression on CDF
from Section IV, in this section, we develop a poisoning
attack for the two-stage hierarchical model of recursive model
index (RMI). Our approach is tailored to the index architecture
proposed by Kraska et al. [18]. We evaluate our attack on RMI
on synthetic and real data under various scenarios.
Structure of Second-Stage Models. According to Kraska
et al. [18], an index architecture that outperforms traditional
B-Trees is comprised of a neural network for the first-stage
model and a linear regression on a CDF for the second-
stage model. As described in Section III-A, each second-
stage model is the “expert” in fine-tuning the prediction on
a fixed subset of keys. During the initialization of the RMI,
the designer partitions the set of all keys, K, into N non-
overlapping subsets K1, . . . ,KN of equal size. With Ri we
denote the set of ranks for the corresponding subset of keys
Ki of the i-th second-stage model. As a next step the designer
independently trains a linear regression on each {Ki, Ri} and
stores the regression parameters wi, bi. Jumping ahead, our
attack exploits the fact that a key-partition step takes place to
decide which second-stage models to poison and how many
keys to inject.
Loss Function for RMI. In this work, we do not consider
the case of poisoning the neural network (NN) model of
the first-stage. The reason behind this design choice is that
according to the experiments in [18], a query key that is used
in the training of the NN model will always direct to the
correct regression model. Therefore, we focus our poisoning
attack on manipulating the models of the second-stage and
assume that the NN model will always point to the correct
(albeit poisoned) second-stage model. Let L({Ki, Ri}, wi, bi)
denote the loss function of the i-th linear regression model of
the second-stage that is trained on the CDF of {Ki, Ri} and
has parameters wi, bi. We define the loss function of the RMI
model as:
LRMI(K) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
L({Ki, Ri}, wi, bi).
Poisoning Threshold per Regression Model. An impor-
tant observation that we use in our attack is that the adversary
controls (1) which regression models to poison among the
second-stage models, and (2) how many poisoning keys to
inject in each regression model. We argue that injecting too
many poisoning keys in a single regression model might
allow a defense mechanism to detect such a behavior. In
our attack, we handle this issue by imposing a poisoning
threshold for each individual regression model, denoted by t.
We remind here that the term poisoning percentage, defined
in Section III-C, controls the total, as opposed to per model,
number of poisoning keys.
A natural first attempt is to pick a fixed poisoning threshold
across all linear regression models to follow the overall poi-
soning percentage, φ, i.e., t = φnN . Such an approach permits
only a single way of allocating poisoning keys to each model,
e.g., if the poisoning percentage φ is 10% on a keyset of size
106 with key partitions of size 103, then the above approach
can only assign 100 poisoning keys on each regression model.
Thus, it is not possible to skew the assignment of poisoning
keys.
To allow more flexibility, we allow the poisoning threshold
to vary across models provide it does not exceed a certain
upper bound. In particular, denoting with ti the poisoning per-
centage of the i-the model, we require ti ≤ t = α · φnN , where
α is a small constant. For example, in our experiments we pick
α ∈ {2, 3} which means that for 10% poisoning percentage in
our previous example we allow up to t = 200 (resp. t = 300)
poisoning keys per regression. This approach permits multiple
ways of assigning poisoning keys to regression models and,
thus, allows our attack to achieve larger LRMI error without
overpopulating with poisoning keys the regression.
Formulation for Poisoning RMI. Let Pi be the set of
poisoning keys injected to the i-th model of the second-stage.
Let φ be the allowed overall poisoning percentage for the RMI
model and let t be the poisoning threshold per second-stage
model. Then the goal of the poisoning attack on two stage
RMI can be expressed as:
arg maxP1,...,PN
N∑
i=1
min
wi,bi
L ({Ki ∪ Pi, [1, n+ |Pi|]}, wi, bi)
such that, |Pi| ≤ t,∀i ∈ [1, N ], and
∑N
i=1
|Pi| ≤ φn
We can re-frame the above problem into two subproblems.
The first is to choose how many poisoning keys are injected
per partition, we call this volume allocation problem, and the
second is to choose which poisoning keys to inject within a
specific partition set, we call this the key allocation problem.
For the latter problem we rely on Algorithm 1 for greedy poi-
soning for regression on CDF. The volume allocation problem
is an N -dimensional integer programming problem with input
vector (|P1|, . . . , |PN |). The search space is comprised of the
volume assignments such that |P1|+ · · ·+ |PN | = φn and the
volume on each dimension is bounded by 0 and t. For realistic
datasets it is infeasible to explore the entire search space of
the above setup.
A. Poisoning Algorithm
Given the discussed formulation for poisoning RMI we
propose an attack that (A) is based on a greedy approach for
the volume allocation problem, and (B) given a fixed volume
per second-stage model it applies Algorithm 1 for the key
allocation problem.
Our Second-Stage Volume Allocation Approach. In
Algorithm 2, we follow a greedy approach that takes locally
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optimal steps for deciding how many poisoning keys to allo-
cate, i.e., volume allocation, at each second-stage regression
model. Note that our attacker has a total of φn poisoning keys
to allocate. As a first step the attacker distributes poisoning
keys uniformly among models, i.e., φn/N poisoning keys for
each of the N second-stage models.
Algorithm 2: GREEDYPOISONINGRMI
Data: Poisoning percentage φ, number of second-stage
models N , keyset K = {k1, . . . , kn} where ki ∈ K,
termination bound , poisoning threshold per regression
model t
Result: Set of poisoning keys P1, . . . , PN such that
P1 ∩ . . . ∩ PN ∩K = ∅, ∑Ni=1 |Pi| = φn, and|Pi| < t.
// Initial Volume Allocation
1 Iterate through all the regression models of the second-stage
and for the i-th model, initialize Pi by injecting φn/N
poisoning keys using Algorithm 1;
2 Compute LRMI by averaging the loss of second-stage models;
// Store effect of exchange i→ i+ 1 in
CHANGELOSS
3 Iterate through all second-stage models; for each model
i ∈ [1, N ], compute the change in LRMI if we were to (A)
add a poisoning key to Pi+1, (B) move the smallest
legitimate key from (i+ 1)-th model to the i-th, and (C)
remove a poisoning key from Pi. Store the difference
between the new LRMI after the above moves and the current
loss LRMI in the entry CHANGELOSS(i, i+ 1);
// Store effect of exchange i← i+ 1 in
CHANGELOSS
4 Iterate through all second-stage models; for each model
i ∈ [1, N ], compute the change in LRMI if we were to (A)
add a poisoning key to Pi, (B) move the largest legitimate
key from i-th model to the (i+ 1)-th, and (C) remove a
poisoning key from Pi+1. Store the difference between the
new LRMI after the above moves and the current loss LRMI in
the entry CHANGELOSS(i+ 1, i);
// Greedy iteration that increase the loss
of the RMI
5 while the change in LRMI is larger than  do
// Perform a Greedy exchange of a
poisoning key with a legitimate key
between consecutive models
6 Find the indices i, j that (A) correspond to the largest
entry CHANGELOSS(i, j) and (B) do not violate the
poisoning threshold t for the j-th model;
7 Perform the exchange i→ j between models i and j and
use Algorithm 1 for adding a poisoning key to Pj ;
// Fix the consistency of CHANGELOSS as
a constant number of entries from
CHANGELOSS were modified with
respect to the previous volume
allocation
8 Recompute the inconsistent entries of CHANGELOSS, i.e.,
entries that address refer to i, or j, or both;
9 end
10 return the set of poisoning keys P1 ∪ . . . ∪ PN ;
The intuition for our greedy approach is that we exchange
a poisoning key for a legitimate key between one regression
model and its neighbor, i.e., either the next model or the
previous model, if this re-allocation causes the maximum
increase in loss function LRMI among all the key-exchanges of
this type. We accompany the re-allocation of a poisoning key
from the i-th model to the j-th model with the (reverse) move
of a legitimate key from the j-th model to the i-th. The above
step guarantees that the number of keys, sum of poisoned
and legitimate, stays fixed throughout the re-allocation moves.
More formally we use the notation i → i + 1 to indicate the
exchange of keys where the direction of the arrow indicates
the move of a poisoning key. Specifically, the first move is that
a poisoning key that was available for placement in the i-th
model now is allowed to be placed into the (i + 1)-th model
instead, and the second move is that the minimum legitimate
key of the (i + 1)-th model is assigned to the i-th model.
Similarly, the notation i ← i + 1 indicates that a poisoning
key that was available to the (i + 1)-th model now moves to
the i-th, and that the maximum legitimate key of the i-th model
is assigned to the (i+ 1)-th model.
For the purpose of Algorithm 2 we need to keep track of
which reallocation of a poisoning key causes the maximum
increase in LRMI. We define a simple two dimensional array
denoted as CHANGELOSS where entry CHANGELOSS(i, i+1)
contains the change in loss LRMI if the attacker executes the
moves implied by i→ i+ 1 given the current state of alloca-
tion. Similarly, the notation CHANGELOSS(i + 1, i) captures
the reallocation i ← i + 1. In every iteration, Algorithm 2
finds the maximum entry of CHANGELOSS and applies the
exchange, see Line 6, with the caveat that the addition of a
poisoning key to j does not violate the upper bound threshold
t of poisoning keys. Algorithm 2 terminates when the greedy
steps towards increasing the LRMI loss are less than , see Line
5.
Performing the set of moves for exchange i → i + 1
(or i ← i + 1) in Line 7, implies that a constant number
of entries from CHANGELOSS are rendered inconsistent since
they rely on an old state of the volume allocation. Interestingly,
because the exchange in keys takes place between models i
and i + 1 it only affects the CHANGELOSS entries of their
direct neighbors, all other models stay unaffected with respect
to their CHANGELOSS entries. Without loss of generality,
we assume that i → i + 1 was chosen. Then, since a new
poisoning key is injected in the (i + 1)-th model and a
legitimate is removed we have to update all the entries that
refer to (i + 1). Thus, we have to recompute the follow-
ing entries: CHANGELOSS(i, i + 1), CHANGELOSS(i + 1, i),
CHANGELOSS(i + 1, i + 2), CHANGELOSS(i + 2, i + 1).
Additionally, we have to recompute the following entries of the
i-th model that now has one less poisoning key and one more
legitimate key: CHANGELOSS(i, i−1), CHANGELOSS(i−1, i).
To compute the updated entry for CHANGELOSS we run
Algorithm 1 which takes time linear to the number of keys
of the second-stage regression model, i.e., O(n/N). Since
there are six updates that take place for the chosen exchange
i→ i+ 1, the complexity of Line 8 is O(n/N).
B. Evaluation on Synthetic Data
In this subsection, we evaluate the effect of the proposed
greedy poisoning attack on RMI models for a plethora of
scenarios. We test the proposed attack in two different key
distributions, the uniform and the log-normal, much like the
original work that proposed RMI [18]. Our experiments show
that the RMI error of the poisoned key set increases up to
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Fig. 6. Evaluation of the multi-point poisoning for RMI. Each boxplot shows the ratio of the regression MSE loss on the poisoned keyset over the regression
MSE loss on the legitimate keyset across all second-stage models. The ratio between the loss of the poisoned RMI model and the non-poisoned is represented
with a black horizontal line. The first two rows correspond to uniform key distribution and the next two rows correspond to log-normal key distribution. The
number of legitimate keys is “Keys”, the size of the key domain is “Key Domain”, the number of second-stage models is “#Models”, and the number of keys
at each model is “Model Size”. The X-axis represents different poisoning percentage and the color of the boxplot denotes different α values for the poisoning
threshold per regression model.
300× and the error of the individual regression increases up
to 3000×.
Setup. In the first set of experiments, see the first two
rows of Figure 6, we produce synthetic data sets of keys
that are uniformly distributed in key domains |K| = 106 and
|K| = 108. In the second set of experiments, see the last
two rows of Figure 6, we produce synthetic data sets of keys
that are distributed in the same key domains but using a log-
normal distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 2, which is the same
parameterization as the experiments in [18].
We implemented three different architecture for assigning
legitimate keys to second-stage models, i.e., RMI architectures,
so as to validate our approach across different efficiency and
accuracy trade-offs for RMIs. The first scenario analyzes the
case of a large number of second-stage models, specifically
105 indicated with “#Models” on the title of the boxplot, where
each is responsible for a small number of keys, specifically 102
indicated with “Model Size”. In this setup the index requires
larger storage overhead but outputs more accurate second-
stage predictions. This is explained because (A) the first-stage
NN model of RMI needs to pick between a large number
of outputs therefore it requires more memory, and (B) there
is a large number of second-stage models and each of them
needs to store its regression parameters; on the upside this
architecture gives a more fine-grained prediction. The above
RMI architecture corresponds to the plots on the first column of
Figure 6. In the second and third architecture we decrease the
number of second-stage models which implies an increase in
the number of keys per model. These architectures correspond
to the boxplots on the second and third column of Figure 6.
Overall, as we iterate through columns of Figure 6 from left-
to-right, the RMI model decreases its storage overhead as well
as its prediction accuracy of the second-stage model. We note
though that in [18] the authors perform a “last mile” local
search to fix potential errors in the prediction therefore the
prediction error is handled by paying the cost of a local search.
Finally, we tested two different multiplicative constants α of
poisoning thresholds for each individual second-stage model.
Results. The results of our evaluation are presented in
Figure 6. Each boxplot shows the ratio loss across all second-
stage linear regression models. We present the ratio loss
for each regression model individually so as to provide a
more fine-grained analysis of how the attack performs. We
also present the ratio between the loss of the poisoned RMI
model and the non-poisoned RMI with a black horizontal line.
As is expected when the poisoning percentage increases the
effectiveness of the attack increases as well. For a fixed row
of boxplots in Figure 6, we see that the larger the second-
stage model the better our attack performs. This phenomenon
is explained by the fact that the linear regression is responsible
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Fig. 7. Evaluation of the multi-point poisoning for RMI applied on the CDF of the unique salaries of employees from Dada County in Miami. The X-axis
represents different overall poisoning percentage where the second-stage poisoning threshold α takes value α = 3. The second row presents the CDF.
for more data therefore there are more opportunities for the
poisoning to increase its effectiveness. Given the same key
distribution and setup we see that the size of the key domain
did not affect significantly the performance of our poisoning
attack on RMI, i.e., the loss for RMI is slightly larger for key
domain 109 compared to 5 · 107. Additionally, the difference
between the error for poisoning threshold per regression α = 2
and α = 3 is not significant.
We observe that the performance of the attack is superior in
the log-normal distribution compared to the uniform. In fact,
the ratio loss is up to 2× larger for the same RMI setup.
Interestingly, the whiskers of the boxplot are close to 3× larger
for the case of the log-normal distribution, which implies a
much larger spread of ratio loss values among the second-stage
models. This is explained by the fact that in the log-normal
case, we have some regressions that handle concentrated keys
and by poisoning these models, we amplify the non-linearity
of the legitimate keys which results in larger errors. In general,
for the log-normal distribution, the RMI error presents up to
300× increase whereas in the individual second-stage level we
observed up to 3000× error increase on the regression model.
C. Evaluation on Real-World Data
In this subsection, we evaluate the proposed greedy poi-
soning attack on RMI models on two real-world datasets: (1)
salaries of the employees of Dade County in Florida [24]; and
(2) latitudes of the geolocation of schools from the publicly
available OpenStreetMap dataset [30]. The latter dataset was
also used in the original LIS paper [18]. Our experiments
on [24] and [30] show that the RMI error of a poisoned key set
increases up to 24× and the error of the individual regression
increases up to 70×.
Setup. We mount our attack to the following datasets:
(A) We use the publicly available dataset of salaries of
employees of Miami Dade County in Florida [24]. We only
take unique salaries between $22,733 and $190,034, i.e., we
pre-process to filter the outliers. The final dataset has n =
5, 300 keys in a key universe of size m = 167, 301 which gives
a 3.71% key density. The cumulative distribution function is
depicted in Figure 7.
(B) We use the publicly available geolocation dataset
[30] and index by the latitudes of locations. We pick the
data points that are labelled as schools over the world with
latitudes between -30 and +50; and scale up the latitudes by
12
15,000 before rounding to achieve uniqueness of keys. The
final dataset has n = 302, 973 keys in a key universe of
m = 1, 200, 000, which yields a 25% density. The cumulative
distribution is depicted in Figure 7.
In both experiments, we test three different RMI model
setups. In the first setup, we initialize the second-stage models
with 50 keys each, which translates to 106 second-stage models
for dataset (A) and 6,059 second-stage models for dataset (B).
In the second setup, we initialize the second-stage with 100
keys each, which translates to 53 models for dataset (A) and
3,029 models for dataset (B). In the third setup, we initialize
the second-stage with 200 keys each, which translates to 26
models for dataset (A) and 1,514 models for dataset (B). For all
the setups, we consider the poisoning threshold of the second
stage model to have parameter α = 3. Finally, we considered
poisoning percentages 5%, 10%, and 20%.
Results. The results of our evaluation are presented in
Figure 7. For a fixed setup, we observe that as the poisoning
percentage increases, the ratio loss increases as well. Among
all experiments in both datasets, the RMI loss increases
between 4× to 24×. Since the number of poisoning keys per
second-stage model is a percentage over its number of keys, we
see that larger models allow more poisoning and, consequently,
larger RMI error. The discrepancy between the effectiveness of
the attack on synthetic data and the real data is partly explained
by the fact that the synthetic dataset is four orders of magnitude
larger than the real dataset.
VI. DISCUSSION
Defense Algorithms and Mitigations Mitigations of poi-
soning attacks have been studied extensively in recent years.
As the major focus are put into neural networks [39], [32], [21]
and classification tasks [5], [1], there are very few works on
mitigation of linear regression poisoning attacks. Liu et al. [19]
proposed a robust training algorithm on high dimensional
linear regression models. This algorithm, however, addresses
noise in high dimensional data. Interestingly, poisoning CDF
functions tends to “populate” relatively dense areas of the key
space and as a result we expect that the poisoning points (in
this new CDF context) to remain undetected when removing
noise.
Jagielski et al. [16] proposed a poisoning detection al-
gorithm, TRIM, on linear regressions. TRIM recovers the
legitimate non-poisoned dataset by searching for the keys that
cause the largest loss and identify them as poisoning keys.
There are two major limitations in applying TRIM to our
attack. Firstly, in our setting, the ranks each key depends on
the value of all other keys in the dataset; this implies that the
mitigation has to iteratively re-calibrate its parameters and as
a result become extremely inefficient. Secondly, our poisoning
keys are typically concentrated around legitimate keys. Thus,
we believe that TRIM cannot remove poisoning keys without
removing also a significant amount of legitimate keys.
Besides existing mitigations, we also observed from ex-
periments that our algorithm does not work as well on the
distributions that have very dense clusters of keys that are far
apart from each other. This is because the second-stage linear
regression model already perform poorly on such distributions.
As a result, injecting poisoning keys to the existing clusters
does not significantly increase the (already large) loss. We note
though that RMI models themselves do not perform well on
such datasets.
Finally, our attack algorithm relies on the fact that the
second-stage model is linear and that the model size is con-
stant. In response, future learned index structures may choose
more complex final-stage models which is a design choice that
might negatively affects the storage overhead.
Future Directions We have shown in our theoretical
analysis that regression on CDFs has intriguing properties.
While we have a good theoretical understanding of injecting
a single poisoning key into linear regressions, the properties
of the search space of injecting multiple keys need to be
further investigated. Also, recent works propose learned index
structures based on different regression models [9], [6] as well
as interpolation structures [33], [37]. It is worthwhile studying
the vulnerabilities of these models. Another extension of our
work is to study adversaries that are capable of removing and
modify keys and adversaries with limited knowledge on the
model parameters, e.g., black-box attacks. Finally, as more
follow-up works support updates and deletions [10], [7] we
need to consider adversaries that use the update functionality
of LIS to expand their attack surface.
VII. CONCLUSION
Learned index structures [18] set the vision for achieving
the functionality of data structures using machine learning
models. What differentiates this new paradigm from previous
approaches is that ML-models adapt to the (training) data at
hand. In this work we propose poisoning attacks that exploit
the above advantage for adversarial purposes. Our attacks
poison ML-models on CDFs which is a family of functions
that have not been studied before with respect to its adversarial
robustness. We demonstrate our attacks on synthetic and real
datasets under various distributions and LIS parameterizations
and show that they achieve significant slow-down in every
tested scenario.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Recall that the loss function L(kp) is:
L(kp) = min
w,b
(
n+1∑
i=1
(wki + b− ri)2)
= min
w,b
(
∑
i6=p
((wki + b− ri)2) + (wkp + b− rp)2)
The objective is finding the kp that maximizes the loss.
Although w and b are results of minimization problem that
depends on kp, we denote them as variable in the following
definition of Loss:
L′(kp, w, b) =
n∑
i=1
(wki + b− ri)2 =
∑
i6=p
(wki + b− ri)2
To prove L convex over kp, it is sufficient to prove that L′
is convex because L′ is a minimization problem of L. For all
i 6= p, (wki + b − ri)2 is a quadratic function and is thus
convex. Therefore, only (wkp + b − rp)2 is potentially non-
convex (w and kp are both variables). While this term is not
strictly convex for any {w, kp, b}, we observe from experiment
14
that the non-convexity of this term does not overwhelm the rest
n− 1 convex terms. Consider:
L′(kp, w, b)+L′(kp+2, w+2w, b+2b)−2L′(kp+1, w+w, b+b)
where w and b are small gradient values. After simplifying
we have:
(
∑
i 6=p
2(wki + b)
2)+4w((w+w)(kp+1)+(b+b)−rp)+62w
Since w is a small value and (w+ w)(kp+1) +(b+ b)− rp
the loss of poisoning key bounded by poly(L), the second term
is overpowered by the squared positive terms. Therefore, the
loss is convex.
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Fig. 8. Evaluation of the multi-point poisoning for linear regression on CDF. Each boxplot shows the ratio of the evaluation of the MSE loss on the poisoned
keyset over the evaluation of the MSE loss on the legitimate keyset over 20 runs. The legitimate keys are distributed according to a normal distribution.
Specifically, for a key domain U = [α, β] we form the normal distribution with mean µ = (β + α)/2 and standard deviation σ = (β − α)/3. The number of
legitimate keys, denoted as “Keys” and the size of the key domain, denoted as “Key Domain” are presented on the title of each plot. The number of poisoning
keys varies on the X-axis and is represented as a poisoning percentage with respect to the number of legitimate keys.
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